AMERICAN

F.O.
371

[redacted]

1942

UNITED STATES

FILE No. 399
pps 6075 – 7629

CLOSED
UNTIL
1972

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AN

A 6075

1942

Registry Number } A 6075/399/45

FROM Foreign Office Minute (Mr. Butler).

No. -

Dated 26th June:1942

Received in Registry } 29th June:1942

A: United States.

Appointment of Mr. Denys Smith as Press Attaché at Washington.

Draft telegram to Washington referring to telegram from Washington No.316 Empax regarding Mr. Denys Smith having accepted a press position with Mr. Butler. Enquiring whether this carries diplomatic rank and if so whether Lord Halifax has been consulted.

Last Paper.

A. 5949

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel. W'ton No. 4014.
26th June

[illegible]

39670

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

A 6403.

(Minutes.)

A copy of Washington tel No 316 Empax is within

CM 30.6

(1) [illegible]

Addns 1 & 2

I don't think we wd welcome Mr. Faulkner as an addn. to the Embassy staff — unless he will bury the hatchet which he has plunging into Mr Haggard.

Akin

A good thing he isn't available.

F. E. Evans 1/7

2) Min. of Information. 9th July
(Tel to Washington No 366 Empax. 27th June)
(Washington tel no 334 Empax. 30th June)
(3) Tel. to Washington no 393 Empax. 3rd July

S. American Dept. wd see addn 3

CM 20.7

In 1940 or early 1941, just before the Lend-Lease Bill was introduced or while it was under discussion, we heard privately from New York that Denys Smith, the active and excellent correspondent of the Daily Telegraph in Washington, was ~~about~~ soon to publish his book with severe criticisms of Mr Stimson, who was then battling on our behalf with Congress in various connexions. I therefore saw Smith and persuaded him to hold the book back.

I incline to think that its publication now might do positive good in clearing the air, though probably only after an explosion, and in any case I do not know what ~~at~~ legal (as opposed to other) powers we have to prevent publication. But one of the tiresome features of these man to man telegrams is that one never knows who else has been consulted and

It might be well to enquire whether the Embassy have considered whether publication is desirable. I submit a tentative draft which I wd. send to M.O.I. if approved.

M Butler
3/viii

Mr L[illegible].

I think a telegram like this might go. There is a definite I.O. as well as Afg. interest.

3/7/[illegible]

[CYPHER] **EMPAX**

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF INFORMATION.

Viscount Halifax,
No. 316 EMPAX
24th June 1942

D. 10.45 p.m. 24th June 1942

R. 7.15 a.m. 25th June 1942

Following for Darvall from Cruikshank. Following his telephone conversation with the Minister, Butler to-day arranged with Denys Smith to take position of Press Counsellor.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. A ....

N. M. B.

Draft. TELEGRAM.

H.M. Ambassador,
Washington.

No. 4014
June 26

Cypher. IND 14/K

Mr Mallet first
AMM 26.6.

Departmental No. 1

Copy:
~~M.O.I (Mr Darvall)~~

NB.

OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.,

June, 1942.

A 6075
29 [illegible] 1942

IMPORTANT.

We see from EMBAX 316 that Denys Smith has accepted press position with Butler. We do not know whether this will carry diplomatic rank, If so, presumably you have been consulted.

NB.
26/vi

4409

OUTWARD TELEGRAM.

A.......

OUT FILE

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 4014.

26th June, 1942.   D. 5. 15 p.m. 26th June, 1942.

wwwwwww

IMPORTANT.

We see from Empax No. 316 that Denys Smith has accepted press position with Butler. We do not know whether this will carry diplomatic rank, if so, presumably you have been consulted.

INDIV.

Registry No.
AN 6075/399/45

Draft.

H.M. Ambassador
Washington

No. 4171
July 4

DEDIPP.

Cypher

Deptal. No 1.

NB.

10.40 pm

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

OUT FILE

Your tel. No. 834 Empax [of July 1: Denys Smith]

You will recollect that in ~~[illegible]~~ 1940 or early 1941 the Embassy persuaded SMITH to withhold publication of this book. He gave no pledge and ~~things~~ circumstances have of course changed greatly since then, and it may even be desirable that some such book by an Englishman should be published. ~~[illegible]~~

I should however be glad to be assured that ~~[illegible]~~ you have fully considered the question of publication.

4/7/45

A 6003/3241/45

OUT FIL

OUTWARD TELEGRAM.

[Cypher]. DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 4171.
4th July, 1942. D. 11.5 p.m. 4th July, 1942.

VVVVVVV

Your telegram No.334 Empax [of July 1st: Denys Smith].

You will recollect that in 1940 or early 1941 the Embassy persuaded Smith to withhold publication of this book. He gave no pledge and circumstances have of course changed greatly since then, and it may even be desirable that some such book by an Englishman should be published.

I should however be glad to be assured that you have fully considered the question of publication.

INDIV.

INDE

34 45

[Cypher]. **EMPAX.**

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF INFORMATION.

Sir R. Campbell.
No. 357 EMPAX. D. 1.49 a.m. 5th July, 1942.
4th July, 1942. R. 10.45 a.m. 5th July, 1942.

VVVVVV

For Radcliffe from Butler.

My telegrams Nos.3~~3~~6 and 334. [illegible] 2)
6

[?Denys] Smith has now declined the Press Counsellorship. I made it clear that he had to choose between publishing his book and accepting the Embassy post and he decided for the book. This has been a great disappointment to me but as Smith himself recognises that it is impossible to reconcile his views in the book with a position on my staff. Nor do I think his appointment would be feasible after an interval had elapsed following publication, for printed criticisms would certainly be revived, particularly in the minds of Mr. Stimson and the State Department.

2. I have been thinking over alternative to Smith but you will appreciate that the field is very narrow. Of British newspaper correspondents in Washington or New York C.V.R.Thompsor Alexander Faulkner, and Robert Waithman would alone appear suitable candidates but I understand that for various reasons they are not available. I know you will agree that it is vitally important that this office should be adequately manned during this period, and so I must ask you to consent to my retaining Marett's services until I have been able to find a Press Counsellor.

INDIV.

Telephone No.
EUSton 4321.
[illegible]legrams :
“[illegible]ORM, LONDON.”
Any further communication should be addressed to :
The Director General
and the following reference should be quoted :

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION,
MALET STREET,
LONDON, W.C.1.

6075 3[illegible] 45

With the Compliments of the

Ministry of Information

American Division

July 9th 1942

COPY 27th June 1942

BRODROME WASHINGTON

CYPHER Empax 366

Following for Butler from Radcliffe.

Your No. 318 EMPAX.

Very glad we have been able to arrange Denys Smith. Can you give me an approximate date when we can expect Cruikshank and Marett to be free to move? You know our wish for Cruikshank and Grubb hopes Marett will be free by beginning of July.

Despatch authorised by C. Radcliffe.

AMERICAN DIVISION

[CYPHER] **EMPAX**

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF INFORMATION.

Viscount Halifax, D. 12.03 p.m. 1st July 1942
No. 334
30th June 1942 R. 7.20 p.m. 1st July 1942

Your telegram No. ~~336~~. 366

Following for Radcliffe from Butler.

Hitch has arisen over Smith's appointment. I have just been informed that he has written a book on American foreign policy which Jonathan Cape in England and MacMillan in United States are arranging to publish shortly. This book contains numerous criticisms of Mr. Stimson, the State Department and Congress, and it would be obviously undesirable that Press Counsellor at Embassy should be identified with such views. Smith, however, who has given two years to writing the book is reluctant to withdraw it and would prefer to wait till after its publication to test reactions and then consider whether it would be possible for him to join my staff. He asks for three days to consult his publishers and to make his final decision. You will appreciate that this makes it difficult for me to release Marett at the beginning of July as Grubb wishes. I would like him, if you approve, for a few weeks until my reorganisation is completed. I have dealt with Cruikshank's position in a separate telegram.

[INDIV.]

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

075 31 4

[CYPHER] EMPAX

FROM MINISTRY OF INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON

No. 393 EMPAX
3rd July, 1942. D. 1.30 a.m. 4th July, 1942.

SSSSS

Your telegram No. 334.

Following for Butler from Radcliffe.

I am very sorry that Smith's book is on the lines you indicate. I think that we must make up our minds now that he could not be appointed Press Counsellor once it has been published, whatever the reactions. It really amounts to a choice between his taking a post under the Government which is offered to him and which everyone regards as important and remaining outside and publishing his book. I hope that you can persuade him.

I appreciate that this alters Marett's departure. But, if at all possible, I would like him to be free to get back to Mexico by end of July. He is due to visit England this autumn and Bonham Carter's visit to Central America, already postponed, depends on his movements.

[INDIV]

85

AN

A 6403
8 JUL 1942

Registry Number: A 6403/399/45

FROM Mr. A. Dudley (communicated)

No.

Dated 6th July,
Received in Registry 8th July, 1942.

A: United States.

Anglo-American Relations and British Representation in the United States.

Memorandum on Anglo-American Relations and British Representation in the United States. The memorandum is in five parts under the headings (1) Introduction (2) Representation of Britain in American (3) The form of British representation in American (4) The proper function of publicity and (5) Recommendations.

1 Mr Dudley to Sir D Scott July 13
2 — — to Mr [illegible] July 30.
3) — = Sir D Scott Aug 3.

Last Paper. A 6073

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)
Reply to Mr. Dudley from Sir D. Scott. 3 Sept

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
[illegible] 13/1	13/1/43

Next Paper. A 6503
(A 11373/-/45 1943)

(Minutes.)

This memorandum by Mr. Dudley, who was associated with the British Library of Information in New York from 1932 until recently, on British representation in the U.S. raises issues of far-reaching importance from the point of view of considering our present and future relations with America. As it is of some length, it may be found useful to summarise its main points.

Section 1.

The burden of Mr. Dudley's thesis is contained in the introductory section of his paper and is as follows: In recent years, especially since the development of broadcasting, there has been a rapid, almost revolutionary change in the extent to which public opinion abroad influences the policies and actions of Governments. The war has hastened the process still further. To some extent, therefore, the relationship in which a Government stands towards public opinion of foreign [illegible] vis-à-vis its own public. It follows from this that just as a Government must continually explain and justify its actions to its own electorate, in order to retain its support and confidence, it is only less important for it to ensure that its actions likewise receive the approval of public opinion of countries with which it seeks to maintain close relations. This principle is of particular importance in the case of relations between this country and the U.S. and the Dominions.

Section 2.

At present, the machinery on which His Majesty's Government must rely for the presentation of its case in the U.S. consists of the Embassy, the Consulates and the British Information Services. Mr. Dudley is at pains to draw a sharp distinction between what he considers to be the functions of the first two, namely "representation" and of the last, which he holds should be strictly confined to "publicity". The duty which devolves upon the Embassy and Consulates is defined as the task of representing the British Government to the U.S. Government and the British people to the American people. Publicity, which is the proper function of the B.I.S., should be regarded as a purely technical one and may be

23446 2 42 F.O.P.

be defined as the art of making use of the channels of popular communication. It is strictly the servant of representation as defined above and can in no sense take its place.

From the criticism of many British people in the U.S. it is apparent "that the basic conditions for good representation have not been achieved". The fault lies at home in the failure of the Government to provide authoritative and unified political direction. Mr. Dudley feels that it should be the special concern of a Minister of Cabinet rank, aided by a special Cabinet secretariat, to furnish the necessary political direction. The next pre-requisite to successful representation in America (and also in the Dominions and other democratic countries) is strict cnetralisation of authority. In theory this is already achieved by virtue of the fact that the Ambassador is senior to the heads of all the various Missions, but in practice some of these have allowed their public relations work to be carried on by junior officials without reference to the Embassy. Further, in the absence of any clear understanding of the problems involved and of the need for unity in our relations with America, the tendency has been both in London and in Washington to rest satisfied with the assumption that the cultivation of American public opinion was the business mainly of the M.O.I. and that its local representatives should be charged not merely with the functions of publicity, but also with the policy of representation.

Mr. Dudley claims that Lord Lothian had a very clear conception of the proper nature and need for unity in our representation. He likewise demonstrated, by his creation of the British Press Service, his recognition of the useful though subordinate part publicity might play. During the spring and summer of 1940, he was in full control of the policy of presenting to the American people Britain's need for ships and the advantages which would accrue to the U.S. if these could be met, and the skilful method used by him, which culminated in the acquisition of the 50 destroyers, may be cited as an outstanding example of a successful policy of representation. Lord Halifax's broadcast of February 2nd 1942, which was designed to offset the strong current of U.S. opinion critical to the British war effort, is another successful example. But these and others are isolated incidents; what is needed is a continuous development of policy with strong backing from London.

Section 3.

Mr. Dudley offers some observations on our actual representation in the U.S. He speaks of the low reputation unfortunately enjoyed by the Embassy, for which the officials themselves are not entirely to blame, the more so as their training "has never been concerned adequately with the special nature and rapid development of the conditions of representation in democratic countries" (page 12). Similar considerations apply to Consulates, which suffer from the additional handicap of receiving practically no political directives.

The history of the evolution of the B.L.I. and the emergence of the B.P.S. is traced (page 13 et seq.). Mr. Dudley claims that after Lord Lothian's death and the amalgamation of both organisations into the B.I.S. in 1941, "unified representation in America and the proper use of publicity as one of its arms ceased". Not only did the M.O.I. through its representatives undertake almost the whole duty of representation, but it came to be assumed, in the complete absence of any policy emanating from London, that policy could be made by the Ministry's officials in America. In due course, as a result of various criticisms of this new organisation, the M.O.I. resorted to changes of personnel, which in the writer's view will do little to improve matters until changes are also made in the whole theory and practice of representation.

Section 4.

This contains further criticism of the M.O.I. in general and the American Division in particular for confusing the technical function of publicity "with the wider task of representation." Publicity, to be successful in America, must as far as possible be conducted unobtrusively: the "publicity man" should remain anonymous. This cardinal rule was broken with the appointment of Sir Gerald Campbell. Until then, the B.P.S. had hardly received mention in the press, but the advertisement given to it by the appointment of such a well known figure led to frequent references in the press, which were often unfavourable, so that the effic~~iency~~acy of the B.P.S. declined in consequence. Mr. Dudley further claims that much of the personnel lacked the necessary training and experience and that this handicap, in addition to the lack of policy and planning, "together account for the inefficiency of British publicity machinery in America" (page 21).

Section 5.

Mr. Dudley makes several recommendations, of which the following are the most important:

Representation.

(a) He reiterates the need for ~~the~~ unified control of our political representation abroad, preferably under the direction of a Minister not additionally burdened with responsibility for our purely diplomatic relations with foreign Governments. He suggests, therefore, that the Foreign Secretary should be the senior Minister in charge of all aspects of foreign relations, with a Minister responsible ~~to~~ for the F.O. subordinate to him. The problems of representation to the Dominions are very similar. ~~to those of the U.S.~~

(b) /

R

(b) The Ambassador should have complete political control over all Government Missions, the political liaison between London and Washington should be greatly strengthened, and to this end more frequent journeys home should be paid by the Ambassador and ~~officials concerned with the representation.~~ Embassy and Consular staffs Finally, all ~~such~~ these officials should be given special training in "the purposes and requirements of representation in a democratic country" (page 24).

Publicity.

(a) The function of publicity must be subordinate to that of representation. Accordingly instructions as to policy should follow the line: Cabinet to Foreign Minister to Ambassador to publicity specialists, and not from the M.O.I. to publicity specialists direct.

(b) The need for special technical training of publicity officials should be recognised and methods of selection improved.

(c) The function of publicity and representation must not be confused.

American Representation in Britain.

The improvement of British representation in the U.S. is only half the object. For this reason any attempt by the Americans to maintain a similar organisation in this country should be encouraged.

The greatest drawback of Mr. Dudley's memorandum is that it comes at an awkward moment. With our publicity organisation in the U.S. now firmly established under control of the M.O.I., it comes two years too late; on the other hand, as a suggestion for the future, with the prospects of peace and general reconstruction still unfortunately remote, it may be regarded as somewhat premature. Even if there were sufficient support for the idea, it would, I imagine, be found impracticable for a variety of reasons to reorganise once more our entire publicity machinery in the U.S. at the present time and to set up a new political department here under a Cabinet Minister, which would work~~ing~~ in close co-operation with the Foreign Office ~~Secretary~~, ~~which~~ and would completely supersede the functions formerly exercised by the M.O.I. We may therefore dismiss the idea of a radical reorganisation of the existing system, at all events for the present. At the same time there are very strong reasons in favour of improving our representation in the U.S. as far as is possible within the existing framework. However, in considering any changes at this stage, we should do well to bear in mind what our future goals with regard to representation and publicity in the U.S. should be, so that any modifications we may make will eventually fit into the desired pattern. For this reason, it is not too early to begin an examination of the important issues raised in Mr. Dudley's memorandum.

Few will contest the view that after the war H.M.G. will have to pay a great deal more attention to public opinion abroad, especially in democratic countries such as the U.S. and the Dominions, than has been the practice in the past. At the same time, I feel that the problem is not such as to justify the creation of a new super-Cabinet Office to deal with public relations, under which the functions of the F.O. would be confined to the purely technical business of diplomatic relations with foreign Governments. Mr. Dudley himself is alive to the dangers of lack of coordination in foreign policy which might arise under such a system. What is needed is not a new department, but an authoritative voice which in the field of foreign publicity would be able to speak for H.M.G. as a whole and lay down clear and unequivocal lines of policy to be pursued by all officials abroad responsible for representation or publicity. For this purpose a Cabinet Committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign Secretary, on which other interested Government Departments would be represented, and which would meet periodically to lay down main lines of political directives, might provide an adequate alternative. (A suggestion for the establishment of a special department to deal with American affairs - a proposal also mentioned by Mr. Dudley - has previously been put forward by Professor Whitehead and discussed in a minute in A 2783/101/45) of 1941.

The task of giving effect to policy through publicity abroad might be carried out by press officers, attached to the Embassy and the more important Consulates, whose activities would come under the supervision of the Ambassador. These press officers might form part of a specialist "Press Attaché's Service" under a Department of the Foreign Office in a manner somewhat analogous to that ~~of~~ the Commercial Diplomatic Service under the D.O.T., though in the case of the former the supervison of the FO. would be much closer.

While the precise ~~nature~~ form of our future representation in the U.S. must remain a matter for speculation for the present, we may bear in mind that whatever happens to the more ephemeral organisations set up in war-time by the M.O.I., our Embassy and Consulates will remain as the solid backbone of our representation. For this reason any steps taken even now to strengthen the representational rôle that they may play can safely be regarded as permanent improvements. Some progress is already being made along these lines in the proposals to extend our consular representation to various new areas in the U.S. and to increase the volume of confidential guidance material to be supplied to Consuls.

With regard to Mr. Dudley's more specific criticisms of our present publicity organisation, I feel that his main point regarding the need for a rigid line of demarcation between the functions of "representation" and "publicity" is somewhat exaggerated. The distinction should rather be one of emphasis: the publicity official should mainly concern himself with the technical process of getting a prescribed line of publicity followed in as many quarters and through as many different media as possible, while it is the function of "representative officials" (H.M. Diplomatic and Consular Officers) to interpret and explain. There is bound to be overlapping and, as Mr. Dudley himself points out, every British official in the U.S., whether concerned with publicity or not, is inevitably thought of by Americans as a representative of Britain. ~~What is important~~. It does ~~is~~ not matter so much whether or not those concerned with publicity undertake a certain amount of activity of a political nature, but what is absolutely essential is that in so doing they should conform rigidly to the same line pursued by those primarily charged with our political representation. For this reason Mr. Dudley's criticism of general lack of coordination in our representational policy in the U.S. and the alleged tendency of local M.O.I. officials to pursue independent lines of policy on their own initiative is more serious. With regard to the former, the remedy lies in a greater measure of liaison between the F.O. and the M.O.I., which should not be impossible even under the present system. As far as the latter is concerned, the situation has doubtless improved since the re-organisation at present being carried out by Mr. H. Butler, though it should be watched.

Since Mr. Dudley's last paragraph was written, the Americans have decided to establish a branch office of the Office of War Information in London. This is a development which, as Mr. Dudley says, should clearly be encouraged, for we have more to gain than the Americans in establishing an information service. The existence of a similar U.S. organisation here may strengthen our case for maintaining some form of publicity machinery in the U.S. even after the war.

E. & R. Dept.

D.I.D. J.K.C. 11/1

~~Professor Whitehead~~.

Prof Whitley

16.10

J. G. Tahourdin

18th July 1942.

Mr. Dudley's concern with the need for subordinating propaganda or publicity to policy touches a question which Sir David Scott had in mind in his minute of June 20th (attached) - the need for a policy to which our programme of publicity in the United States could be related. It is, I think, for lack of a controlling policy that the Ministry of Information have come into control of the function of formulating, as well as that of executing, whatever there may be of a programme in the cultivation of our relations with the United States. Mr. Dudley points out that our relations with the American people must be cultivated no less carefully than our relations with the American Administration. In this field the method of presentation of our case has been too much on the lines of the Low cartoon, in which our publicity organisation was pictured as weakly reiterating: "oooh, you big cad: we didn't!" Certainly it has been in the main a matter of improvised defence against particular criticisms and accusations; it has not been developed in pursuit of a positive plan or policy, for we are still without a policy.

This question was considered in the paper referred to above and in a minute dated May 18th Mr. Butler suggested alternative attitudes towards the United States, of which the third seems to hold the greatest promise: that "the war will have been largely fought in vain if at the end of it the relations between the British Commonwealth and the U.S.A. are not . . . much more intimate than they were up to 1939". Until a pattern and an objective are set for our representation in the United States it can do little more than patch the rents in American understanding of us. Perhaps the time for the enunciation ~~annunciation~~ or even the private recognition of a policy aiming at the establishment of a more intimate relationship between the United States and the British Commonwealth is not yet, but the uniting of our troops in battle and the intertwining of our military and economic systems in the prosecution of the war and, we hope and seek, in the protection of the peace, will make for a close understanding and point the way to a lasting intimate relationship. The opportunity to establish that relationship is at hand; the recent speeches of American leaders show the trend of the Administration's mind on international collaboration, a collaboration which, without the closest association between the British Commonwealth and the U.S.A. is impossible of realisation.

Whatever our policy, the responsibility of our representation in the United States will be heavy, and the organisation of our system and the proper devolution of its functions are of the most vital importance. Steps are already in train to improve the effectiveness of our representation and Public Relations organisation by the opening of additional Consular posts, and the provision of information to our local representatives is also under consideration. Whether this organisation can subsist on the practical but unstimulating diet of strict realism in Anglo-American relations remains to be seen.

As to Foreign Office and Ministry of Information liaison, so far as I am aware only once have we had a conference with Ministry of Information officials to consider a plan of publicity in the United States. This was shortly before Mr. Aubrey Morgan's return to the United States. It was, I think, a useful and instructive Meeting and I am sure could be repeated from time to time to the benefit of both Departments. It would certainly help to ensure closer cooperation and coordination.

F. E. Evans 27/7

I think we might begin to collect some points for another meeting.

N.B.
8/x.

Seen by Mr. Butler.

?.S.T.
25/8.

Unless Mr. Dudley envisages an exclusive British Commonwealth – U.S.A bloc, I see little justification for bringing the Dominions into his memorandum. So far as they are concerned his chief points are (i) that ~~representation~~ of H.M.G. in the U.K. should be represented in each ~~the~~ Dominions ~~[illegible]~~ by one central authority. (ii) that representatives ~~officials~~ of H.M.G. in the U.K should be freely transferred within the democratic countries of the British Commonwealth + the U.S.A.

As regards (i), the U.K. High Commissioners, however unsuccessful as personalities or organisers, already have the precise functions suggested by Mr. Dudley.

As regards (ii), it seems to me that officials reared exclusively on democratic principles and the democratic way of life, however much they might contribute to the benefit of the democratic bloc internally, would lack understanding of the non-democratic/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

non-democratic countries and would therefore become dangerous influences on the external relations of the democratic bloc. (See Mr. Balfour's minute on A 27/83/101/45)

R.L.W. Sloan.
2/9.

Sir B. Newton.

See typed minute overleaf

B N

From the point of view of co-operation with the Dominions I agree with the suggestion that U.K. officials should be freely transferred within the Commonwealth and also the U.S.A., i.e. within English speaking territories which have generally speaking not only a common language but a similarity of tradition, laws, outlook and manners. Experience of one of these territories should help a U.K. official in his relations with another and make him simultaneously a more useful and sympathetic interpreter of the U.K. in these territories.

At the same time it seems to me very important that the experience of a U.K. Foreign Service official should not be limited to the Dominions and the U.S.A. He will be expected - particularly in the Dominions - to have had previous diplomatic experience in foreign - and foreign language - countries, and for his own sake also he ought to have had contact with, and understanding of, other ways of life and other outlooks than those which characterise the English speaking democracies.

I would like to take this opportunity of urging very strongly that U.K. Foreign Service officials with the qualifications mentioned above should continue to be appointed to the staffs of the U.K. High Commissioners. It would seem to me most unfortunate if, just when the world is in the melting pot and profound changes in the relations of the U.K. with the Dominions are inevitable, such appointments were to be suspended or filled by officials without adequate experience of the Foreign Office and of Diplomatic Missions abroad. If these officials are of sufficient standing and experience they may be able to influence the development and traditions of the Foreign Services now being built up by the Dominions. Equally they should be able to play an important part in making the U.K. Foreign Office and Foreign Service more Dominion conscious and minded. Both these sides of the work and training of U.K. Foreign Service officials are of considerable importance if the Foreign Service organisations developed by the constituent countries of the British Commonwealth are to grow together instead of gradually growing apart.

Mr Mallet
No. [illegible]
From my fleeting contact with the Dept of External Affairs at Ottawa I feel that this point is of the first importance.

The above is the part of Mr. Dudley's memorandum with which I am concerned but I add the following comments in case they are of any assistance.

In English speaking countries and perhaps in some other countries, e.g. possibly in South America, Public Relations are of great importance and, it may be, of even greater importance than the relations with foreign Governments and foreign officials and the conduct of diplomatic and consular business for which our Foreign Service officials have hitherto been primarily appointed. In these countries therefore our officials either need additional special qualifications or to have the assistance of extra officials with these **special** qualifications (trained perhaps by the Ministry of Information). In the case of Canada I understand that the more routine and official business is largely dealt with by a Deputy High Commissioner, Sir Patrick Duff, thus leaving Mr. Malcolm MacDonald free to travel and meet people and use his personality and standing as an ex-Cabinet Minister for what Mr. Dudley might describe as Representation (and Public Relations). There is no doubt a distinction between Representation and Publicity but I am inclined to think Mr. Dudley over-emphasises it. It is rather like the distinction between Comment and News, and similarly in practice one often merges into the other. Possibly however the appointment of a deputy for the conduct of normal diplomatic business on the lines of what has been done at Ottawa might help to meet the problem of fulfilling two functions, namely the maintenance of good official relations including the transactions of official business and the maintenance of Representation generally including Public Relations and Publicity. Another analogy which may afford guidance is the appointment of Ministers of State to fulfil new and general functions which have recently become necessary at various important centres, namely Cairo, for a time Singapore, and now West Africa. These appointments have not replaced but have been superimposed on the existing normal machinery which remains, in the charge of an Ambassador at Cairo, and Governors at Singapore and in West Africa.

As regards Section I of the memorandum I think there is some confusion in the comparison between the need of a Government to retain the confidence of its electorate and its need to gain the sympathy of public opinion in a foreign country or in a Dominion. The former is a domestic and transient matter concerned primarily with party politics and is therefore provided for by the Party machine. The latter is a foreign matter of continuing national and international concern irrespective of what particular Party or National Government may be in power. For the long term purpose of gaining understanding and sympathy for U.K. (and perhaps the Commonwealth as a whole should be included) institutions, customs and ideals surely the British Council is the right instrument. For winning and keeping the approval of public opinion in foreign countries for specific issues and policies the other machinery is required, i.e. Diplomatic and Consular officials and, where necessary, also officials primarily concerned with public relations and publicity.

B N

1st October, 1942

Communicated by Mr. A. Dudley

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Anglo American Relations and British Representation in the United States

I INTRODUCTION

II THE REPRESENTATION OF BRITAIN IN AMERICA

III THE FORM OF BRITISH REPRESENTATION IN AMERICA

IV THE PROPER FUNCTION OF PUBLICITY

V RECOMMENDATIONS

The following memorandum deals with matters of politics and high policy which may seem to be beyond the ordinary concern of a civil servant. I should not therefore feel justified in believing my opinions to be of any special value if it were not for the responsibility which has already been imposed on me, and on those like me who have served the Foreign Office or the Ministry of Information in dealing with public opinion in foreign countries. We have been charged with a duty which is in its essence political, and which involves the explanation and interpretation of Government policy to foreign publics.

If the actual performance of this political function is regarded as an adequate reason for expressing opinions about its performance I may perhaps claim some privilege to act as a spokesman; for I have probably been actively concerned with such duties for a longer period than any other British official now employed, and have been working in the United States of America, whose public opinion is more important to Britain than any other. I may also be permitted to claim that I am one of those few Government officials whose training prior to employment in Government Service was specifically concerned with public opinion. This is not a point to be laboured; I make no claim to adequate knowledge, and in so far as my opinions concern political organisation in wartime Britain they are especially tentative, because I have not lived in England during the war, and am aware that developments which may hypothetically seem desirable may be politically impossible.

Nevertheless I feel a strong obligation to express the opinions which follow, because I foresee grave dangers in any failure to achieve the maximum of understanding between Britain and America. We can not be satisfied with mere "improvement". The Prime Minister pointed to the goal in closing his speech before the Congress in December: "I avow my hope and faith, firm and inviolate, that in the "days to come the British and American peoples shall "walk together in majesty, in justice, and in peace". This is no easy goal. Tolerance and friendship are difficult enough to achieve, and real cooperation is harder: yet only by making the effort which is necessary to achieve them can we win the war in such a way that it will remain won.

So I make no apology for offering opinions, and ask for them only that they shall be given that amount of consideration which will provoke thought on their subject. I believe them to be justified, but hope that they can be improved and extended.

This memorandum was written on board a ship crossing the Atlantic, and I have therefore had to rely on memory and not on documentary references.

I Introduction

There has been a great deal of discussion during the past few years about the desirability of closer union between Britain and America, or more generally between the democracies. This debate has been largely concerned with the disaster from without which threatens the democracies if they do not combine. But in the meanwhile great changes in their relations have actually occurred, and whatever we may think of "Union Now" or any of the other formulae, the barriers of sovereignty have already broken down to an extent which is quite unrecognised. We continue to argue for and against independence of action when in fact it has already been limited and cannot be restored. The danger from within which arises from this situation is comparable to the danger from without in its magnitude, and unless we find a political method of dealing with it we shall face disaster.

The citizens of each of the democracies are already in some sense the citizens of all of them, and the Governments of each are responsive to the public opinions of all. This is and will remain true however much we may resent and try to ignore it; and the problem is so urgent in so far as it concerns the relations between the great democracies that action is required at once.

It cannot be said that the influence of foreign public opinion is a new problem, for it has probably not been true during the last one hundred and fifty years that any well informed Government has felt itself able to ignore entirely the public opinion of Britain and America. Certainly President Lincoln was aware of the importance of British public opinion in relation to the American Civil War, and the British Government knew well enough the power of American public opinion about Ireland during the last World War. Many other peace and war-time examples could be quoted, and during the last twenty years most European Governments, including the British, have kept a close eye on American opinion on matters of interest to themselves.

But, since the coming of radio broadcasting, which began to be a real factor of political importance only about 1930, there has been so rapid a development in the extent to which Governments are responsive to public opinion in other countries as to constitute almost a revolutionary change. The growth of this essentially democratic form of political relationship has been greatly hastened by the present war, and the countries affected most directly by it are Great Britain, the Dominions and the United States.

No existing Government, and no machinery of representation in foreign countries, is so constructed as to deal easily and satisfactorily with public relations. Because the pressure of public opinion abroad is exerted without any system of voting or political representation, grave stresses and strains arise, and will continue to arise unless some machinery is found which will take that public opinion properly into account. Such expedients as have been adopted so far have been inadequate, because they have been based on inadequate knowledge and consideration of the problems involved.

Yet the problem is not new to Governments: it is analogous to, and in many respects entirely parallels, that which every popular Government has to meet in dealing with its own people. Democracy is a two way process; not only is the Government made by, and responsible to, the people. It also leads, educates, and influences, the opinion of the people. A British Government which concerned itself with public opinion only at election times, and which awaited the expression of public opinion at the polls for its guidance as to its relations with the public, would soon find itself in difficulties and would not survive for long. Governments in democracies do watch carefully for developments of public opinion, and it is indeed a matter of pride that between elections, or in war time when there are no general elections, the British Government is sensitive and responsive to popular opinion. What is equally important is that the Government is continually at pains to defend its policy before the people, in order that they may accept and endorse it, and that a process of public education is thus constantly at work. It may be true that these explanations and this education are often the result of the wish of one group of men to remain in power to the exclusion of others; nevertheless the effect is the same as if their aim was more personally disinterested.

If foreign public opinion has in fact that increasing influence on the policies and actions of Governments which is the fundamental hypothesis of this paper; if democracy has transcended the limits of national sovereignty, even only in a minor degree, it would appear to be the part of a prudent Government to devote to those foreign peoples the same sort of attention, though perhaps not with the same intensity, which they devote to their own public. If this is not done - if a Government fails to work for the approval of any public which holds an influence over its policy and action - that Government is giving hostages to fortune.

The propriety of accepting opinion in foreign countries as a determinant of policy must itself be a matter of policy for the Government concerned: but it is likely to be rather a matter of compulsion than of choice. Certainly foreign opinion is less likely to be hostile to any policy if it is properly explained and supported than if its interpretation is left entirely to the mercy of the press, radio, and other channels of communication which serve the public in question. No Government is in fact fulfilling its duty to its own people if it fails to explain and defend its policies and actions in other countries whose unfavourable opinion may be harmful.

A more delicate question of propriety arises in regard to the kind of education or publicity which may properly be undertaken in another country. No natural or legal right can be asserted in this respect, and such activity must be dependent on the goodwill of the Government of the people to whom the publicity is directed. But, at least as between the free democracies, there is a reasonable assumption that mutual understanding is desired by the Governments, and mutual goodwill concerning the presentation of the views of each to the others should be thought of as mutually advantageous. There are obviously times when immediate interests conflict, and when it may be thought wiser not to permit the statement of foreign views to the public, but in countries which accept freedom of speech and of the press as privileges which are guaranteed by the State there must be a very strong case for the freedom of expression of opinions contrary to those of the Government in power, even by foreigners. Conversely, a Government which wishes to advocate its policies before the people of a foreign country is more likely to achieve success if it tries to work with the approval and support of the Government of that country. It should also be added that there are methods of representation and publicity which are legitimate, and others which are not: the dividing line between the two is fairly obvious if the intentions of those concerned are open and honest, and is determined chiefly by the avoidance of secrecy in operation. It is not the purpose of this discussion to deal with illegitimate activities.

Those are general principles, some of which may be thought too obvious to put on paper, but taken together they do suggest that the British Government, and the Governments of other democracies, have not paid sufficient attention to the duty of attempting to secure greater mutual understanding and goodwill among their peoples.

The rest of this paper will be specific rather than general in character, but its recommendations will be based on the generalisations which have been made in this introduction. For the sake of simplicity, and because it is the subject of the author's most immediate knowledge and concern, it will deal with the relationships which exist between Great Britain and America, and particularly with the relation of American public opinion to British Government, but it is his view that the same considerations will apply, and that in principle the same kinds of development are needed, in regard to relations between Britain and other democratic countries.

II The Representation of Britain in America

In its relations with the British public the British Government has the advantage of being able continuously to state its policy and defend its actions in Parliament, which acts not only as the representative body, but also as the national forum. In addition there is available all the local machinery of politics, and departmental machinery including, in war-time, the Home Division of the Ministry of Information. Moreover, the doctrine of the collective responsibility of the cabinet works to secure a unity of representation of the Government towards the people which is one of the essential factors which make our system of Government workable.

By contrast British representation in America has a more difficult task to achieve, for not only do American individuals hold opinions about the proper policy for the British Government to pursue; they also have opinions about Britain as a country and the British as a nation, which prejudice and limit their views of current events. And, to perform the task, there is no national forum for British Government statements except the British Parliament, whose proceedings are little reported in America; no unity of representation to parallel the joint responsibility of the Cabinet at home; and no political machine of any kind. Instead there is, under the Ambassador, the diplomatic and consular representation designed almost solely to deal with relations between the Governments, and, in war-time, representatives of various British Government departments, concerned almost exclusively with technical problems, together with representatives of the Ministry of Information, whose function is, or should be, not representation in the full sense of the word, but publicity.

It is necessary to empahsise strongly the difference between the meaning of the words "representation" and "publicity" as used here. The task to be performed must be thought of as representation to the American people as well as to the American Government, and it is essentially political and national in its character, rather than administrative and departmental. It is representative of the Government of the United Kingdom, not as a party in power, but as the accepted Government of the people of Britain. It must have, therefore, if it is to be effective, the same unity of character as has the Government at home, and must be part of that Government, in a political as well as an administrative sense. It is conducted in part from England, and only in part in America. It must be guided by certain principles as to the relations between Britain and America; that is to say, there must be a policy as to representation and the way in which it is conducted. Such a policy must be positive and dynamic rather than negative and static in character: it must anticipate and create movements of opinion rather than await their development before action is taken. This does not mean merely that those individuals and organisations charged with the duty of representation must be adequately informed about the policies of their Government though this is an essential prerequisite of successful representation: it means rather that the Government at home, and that part of it which constitutes representation to and in America, must be continuously aware of the general objectives for which they are working, and armed with sufficient resources to work successfully towards those objectives.

"Publicity", as it is used here, is the art of making use of the channels of popular communication and is merely one of the arms available for use in representation. Properly used it may be extremely effective, but it cannot take the place of representation in the wide sense under discussion.

It is inevitable, in the absence of common citizenship and a true union of Governments (which is not a matter for practical immediate discussion) that any machinery of representation will be imperfect: but this can be no excuse for a failure to appreciate the true nature of its objectives, or to make every possible effort to attain them. The difference between the effects of an inadequate and ill informed effort, and one which is well calculated for its purpose, is in this field enormous.

It may be well at this point to recognise the fact that whatever criticisms may be made with justice of the failures of British representation to and in America, the British Government has been more enterprising in this respect than any other. The appointment of political rather than "career" Ambassadors - Lord Lothian and Lord Halifax - during this war, the speeches which the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet have addressed to Americans, the establishment of the British Library of Information as long ago as 1920 by the Foreign Office, all testify to this. There can be no question that sections of the British Government are aware, at least by fits and starts, of American opinion, and prepared to do something to propitiate and sometimes even to try to guide it.

But it is also obvious that the basic conditions of good representation have not been achieved, and it is interesting to notice how acutely aware many British people who live in or visit America have become of this. The usual effect of their observations is to produce strong criticism of British 'propaganda' (or the lack of it) and in a sense they are right. But very few of them have exercised any concentrated thought on the subject, and the usual tendency has been to blame the failure entirely on the personnel charged with representation or publicity, or on the administrative organisation through which it is conducted locally. No one who has been in America as a British official can deny that our representatives there have faults, but to blame them for American opinion of Britain or British policy is too poor and easy an explanation of a very complicated and abstruse problem. Nor have the panaceas suggested ever approached the proper solution: it is not sufficient to appoint journalists, or men with American wives or cousins in Peoria, as our representatives. The authority, knowledge and training of our representatives are indeed of great importance, but by no means all that we need. The solution lies first in England, and only second in America.

Casual visitors to America and responsible officials alike have tended to confuse in their minds the functions of representation and publicity (or 'propaganda'), and out of this has grown a false estimate of the part which publicity can play. As a result responsibilities which are in the highest sense political have been treated as though they were departmental and technical.

One other generalization needs to be made. If the relationship of the British Government to the American people is regarded as a serious political responsibility, there will be little danger that it will be handled as if it were a mere matter of persuading Americans to our point of view by giving them only such portions of the truth as are desirable in the pursuit of some immediate British interest. During the past twenty years the danger of being thus misled has been a constant preoccupation and fear of many Americans. The British 'propaganda' of the last war achieved an entirely unwarranted reputation for extreme efficacy without any reputation for truth, and we have not yet lived it down: it seems improbable that we shall ever do so unless we find some more effective form of representation than that which now exists, because the very lack of political direction and responsibility on the part of officials charged with publicity is likely to lead them into 'propaganda'. Only political responsibility on the part of the Government itself can achieve the kind of honesty in international relations which is essential if the new kind of extra-national democracy is not to become a permanent impediment to good relations in peace and victory in war.

The answer, then, lies first in London, and it is very clear that some means has to be found of injecting into the Cabinet itself a conscious appreciation of the need not only for considering existing American opinion, but for developing, in connexion with each innovation in Government policy which may affect Americans, public explanations of that policy which may serve to make it acceptable, or at least to soften its impact. As to the organization outside the Cabinet, it may be politically unpractical to suggest the need for a department for Anglo-American relations, (or for Democratic representation). But it is not unreasonable to suggest that some Cabinet Minister (presumably the Foreign Secretary) should make this subject his special concern, and that he should have attached to him a section of the Cabinet Secretariat, or a Secretariat of his own, which may serve as a clearing house. It must be stressed in any event that the primary responsibility for public opinion, whether at home or abroad, should never be entrusted solely to departmental officials, however capable.

The other thing which is essential to successful representation in America (and, so far as can be judged, in the Dominions and at least some other countries) is the recognition of the need for unity of representation and centralization of responsibility abroad. In a sense this may be said to be recognised already: the Ambassador represents the Crown, (or the Government) and the appointments first of Lord Lothinan and then of Lord Halifax to Washington have assured a closer connexion between the Ambassadorship and the Government than previously existed. But this does not quite meet the need: for, first of all, accreditation to a Government does not achieve accreditation to a people, and because the Ambassador and his diplomatic staff communicate with the British Government principally though the Foreign Office, and because the Foreign Office is first of all concerned with relations between Governments, the attention of the Ambassador and those round him is distracted more than is desirable from the other aspects of representation. The Ambassador is, to some degree at least, a prisoner of the Foreign Office and the Embassy. This is no criticism of either of the latter: they have their proper duties to perform, and are not organised for other tasks. What is more, the war, with the development of purchasing and lend lease, and of military and naval and economic cooperation, has resulted in a proliferation of departmental missions to the heads of which the Ambassador is senior in a technical sense. But, though they may consult him on questions of policy, their connexion is almost entirely directly with their own departments in London; they are extremely busy, and, having little time for anything but their special interests, leave their public relations and their part in general representation to junior officials appointed for the purpose.

Under these circumstances, no one has had the time or patience to evolve a clear theory or understanding of the general problems involved and no real unity has developed in British relations with America. The tendency in London as well as in America has been to rest satisfied with the assumption that American public opinion is the business of the Ministry of Information, and that its representatives in America should take care not only of publicity, but of the policy of representation. To hand over the control of public relations policy to the Ministry or its representatives is about as wise as to give the responsibility for military strategy to the Signal Corps. Each body has a vital and important function to perform, but if the signalman not only transmits but prepares the messages he sends he is not very likely to achieve any result but confusion: and though the publicity expert must have a valuable contribution to make as to the form of his message, he cannot properly be made responsible for its content.

Clearly some sense of the inappropriateness of separate and independent representation of the Ministry of Information in America has become evident in London, since its senior representative is now stationed in Washington rather than in New York and bears the title of Minister. But this is mere patchwork which does not greatly improve an ill fitting garment. Not only is the problem not departmental in the ordinary sense, but the Ministry of Information, being a new Ministry and without great strength, is ill adapted to obtain that participation by other departments or by the Government as an entity which is essential to success.

This however is a digression to a subject which must be dealt with more fully at a later stage, and on which some recommendations can then be made. Here the essential point is to make clear the need for the creation of some continually open channel from the British Government to the American people, and the importance of unity of representation.

Lord Lothian's reasoned or intuitive grasp of the real nature of representation, and of the subordinate but useful part which publicity might play, was very evident. The former was shown most particularly by his whole handling of the need for American naval cooperation, and of the exchange of British bases for American destroyers: the latter by his creation of the British Press Service which in its beginnings, though financed by the Ministry of Information, was responsible to him. But Lord Lothian was not so well accustomed to the administrative machinery as to be able to make very great headway in the creation of the necessary channel from the Cabinet, and his early death prevented the development of the kind of representation which he clearly thought desirable.

Lord Lothian was however in full control of the policy of presenting to the American Government and people during the spring and summer of 1940 Britain's need for ships, and the advantages which would accrue to America and Britain alike if this need could be met. He might justly claim the full credit for obtaining the fifty destroyers which have been so valuable since then, and his judgment as to the development of public opinion, and his leadership of it, was superb. Some at least of his advisers feared that he was moving too rapidly, but his speeches at Colombia University and New Haven in the spring of 1940 proved how exact was his timing. This was a good example of the formation of a British policy in relation to the American public, and it was noticeable that Lord Lothian's conviction of its rightness was communicated to many other British representatives in America, so that, on this point, some unity of representation was achieved.

Lord Lothian also initiated another development in opinion on American policy - lend-lease - by a few words spoken at the airport on his return from England in early December 1940. Again it was feared that he might have gone too far in advance of American public opinion, and again he was proved to be right. Unfortunately he did not live to see the fruition of lend-lease, but there can be no question that the audacious fillip which he gave to discussion was effective in moving the minds of Americans on this subject to a greater extent than any other single action.

Lord Lothian recognised the importance of having a publicity machinery capable of giving to the press and radio the kind of constant attention which would facilitate the more rapid and wider dissemination of ideas which were in accordance with the policy being pursued by him in relation to American public opinion. It was under his guidance that the British Press Service was established in October 1940, and although he was in England for part of the remaining two months which elapsed before his death, he used the Press Service by giving to it directives as to policy and ideas which were effectively and widely disseminated in America. For example, the treatment of the Battle of the Atlantic, and conceptions as to its meaning and importance, which became widespread on the American radio and in the press, were largely the result of his guidance.

To what extent the ideas to which he gave expression in America emanated from London is unknown, but with a properly working system they should in fact have done so, being tempered and developed by his knowledge and understanding of America, and that of his staff.

Two more recent simple examples of good representation of Britain in America may be mentioned briefly. The broadcast by Lord Halifax in February 1942 was designed to offset the recent and strong current of American opininion critical of British war effort. It was telling and effective as a speech, and although it was negative in character in that its purpose was to meet criticism rather than to mould hitherto unformed opinion, it did produce a trend in comment on the radio and in the press which was favourable. It must however be mentioned that Lord Halifax's speeches do not receive automatically that public attention which was given to Lord Lothian's.

Finally, as a single exercise of the art of representation at its most effective, there are few examples which can excel the broadcast by the Prime Minister on the occasion of the German attack on Russia. This was an expression of view, and a statement of policy, addressed to people all over the world, and at a moment which, if it had slipped past, could never have been recalled. It did indeed form opinion at a stage when it was fluid and might easily have turned in the wrong direction. It gave publicists a line of policy which they could at once recognise as correct, and which they repeated and developed: it is still, indirectly, responsible for a portion of the favourable American opinion of Russia which is now ascribed entirely to the successes of Russian arms.

But if we examine all these instances, or many more which could be given, we find always that there is something lacking which should, and could, be present in the representation of Britain in America. First there is the lack of continuous development of policy: it was clear that Lord Lothian did not receive from London the backing which was necessary, and that he had not that machinery of representation at hand in America which would give the fullest possible development to his efforts. Lord Halifax's speech of February was almost an isolated incident, despite strenuous publicity activity in America intended to surround it with supporting news. And the Prime Minister's broadcast was a supreme exercise of individual skill, almost entirely unsupported by active representation in America.

It will be the purpose of the later sections of this manuscript to examine the recent history of representation to America, and to attempt to assess its virtues and inadequacies, and to make some suggestions for improvement.

III The form of British Representation in America

(a) In Peace time

Judged by the ideals of positive policy and organic unity British representation in America has not, during the last twenty years, achieved the kind of development which was necessary. But in a more obvious respect, that of knowledge of the country and aquaintance with public men, whether in politics or out of it, there has been a retrogression.

It may sound extravagant to attribute a good deal of this failure to the physical location of the Embassy, but it is certainly true that the relation of the Embassy to official and unofficial Washington is far less satisfactory than it was during the last world war, and physical difficulties do account for at least some part of this unfortunate change. The Embassy is on a hill to the north west of Washington near the observatory, which makes it, as has been said, an admirable place for star-gazing, but separates it by about three miles from the White House and the government departments, and four or more from the Capitol. Transportation to and from the Embassy is bad, taxis are difficult to find, there is no space in downtown Washington where officials driving their own cars might park them, and the easiest course for junior and senior officials alike is to lunch and dine at home, and consequently to make few solid aquaintances either among government officials or other persons of importance in Washington; this confines their most frequent contacts to their colleagues and the diplomatic circle.

The society of Washington is surprisingly formal and exacting, and therefore takes up a good deal of the time of Embassy officials, who in war-time also have a vastly increased volume of paper work. These factors work together with the unfortunate physical placing of the Embassy to create a gap between its officials and the kind of Americans with whom they should have the closest and most continuous liaison; and these obstacles are overcome only by those of the greatest energy, or by those who neglect their immediate official duties. The reputation of the British Embassy with Americans who matter is, and has been for the past several years, unfortunately low. It would be a mistake to blame the officials themselves entirely for this: they often have no choice. And it must also be admitted that the training of British diplomats, and of the numerous temporary officials attached to the Embassy in war time, has never been concerned adequately with the special nature and rapid development of the conditions of representation in democratic countries. Nor has this aspect of their duties formed the subject of such constant consideration in and direction from London as is desirable.

The Consulates do not suffer to the same extent as the Embassy from unintelligent selection of their offices. Most of them are in fact well situated in the towns in which they have been placed, though, from the point of view of representation rather than that of trade, the selection of these towns is not all that might be desired. Although they form part of the general Consular Service there are a number of consular officers who have had long experience in America, and who are as individuals good representatives of their country. But because of their special obligations to the British subjects in their districts, and because of certain traditions as to the kinds of Americans with whom they should deal particularly, some of them are not able to devote as much time as is desirable to the function of representation in the sense in which it is used here. Moreover, they have not been specifically trained for this work, and they are especially unfortunate in that they receive almost no political directives from London or Washington whatsoever. This most of them feel to be a most serious omission: and they are right.

The Foreign Office, having observed during the last war the value of the British Bureau of Information (which, it must be noted, was then responsible to the United Kingdom High Commissioner in America) decided in 1920 to set up the British Library of Information. This was at first a very small affair, and though it developed gradually in scope and size it had a staff of only fifteen, and a collection of no more than about [illegible],000 books and documents at the outbreak of war in 1939. Nevertheless, with its small resources it did achieve something towards its principal objective, which was, not publicity for the policy of the British Government, but the promotion of general goodwill for Britain and the British Empire. Its methods were passive rather than active in character, in that it did not as a rule seek out channels of publicity, but was concerned merely to make itself so known that enquirers of the most useful sort might come to it for information. It aimed chiefly at Libraries and Educational institutions, and its success may be measured by the slavish way in which at least three other countries copied its name and many tried to copy its methods. Its success too may be judged by the high repute it held among professional Librarians in America, a group of people who are far more important than their counterparts in England. Its Director and members of its staff were elected to posts of responsibility in the professional organizations of Librarians, and in its own limited way it achieved a real place. But it was not able, and did not attempt, to undertake any of the great tasks of representation which from 1930 onwards became increasingly important.

The Embassy, the Consulates and the Library, together with one or two smaller offices, and semi official representatives of such organizations as the Travel Association constituted, up to 1939, the whole machinery for British representation in America, a country of 130 million people living in an area as large as Europe and far better served than any other nation by those channels of communication which bring foreign news into every man's house and thus make the adequate explanation of that news more necessary

(b) In War time

This was the state of affairs at the beginning of the war. We went into war with, behind us, all the experience of Anglo American relations in 1914 to 1918, and in some directions at least it can be said with satisfaction that the British Government profited by that experience. The most notable exception has been public relations. The chart attached (Appendix I) gives an indication, in skeleton, of the present shape of the British Missions which have proliferated like mushrooms in America.

The great gain, as compared with the earlier war, was in the early establishment of Missions for purchasing, shipping, etc. It was not until after America entered the last war in 1917 that Lord Northcliffe and his Mission were sent out to examine the development of these and other activities, and not until August (September) 1917 that purchasing of American materials and the handling of finance began to be taken out of the hands of private firms in America and controlled by British Government Missions. By contrast technical Missions began to be established almost on the outbreak of the present war, and before America entered this war there were several thousands of employees of the British Government working in Washington and New York and other centres. In America [illegible] in both British and American [illegible] were far more fully organized for technical cooperation than they were a year after America entered the last war. In one respect which touched on the whole question of representation there was, however, a most important difference. Lord Northcliffe was sent to America in the early autumn of 1917 and became, as High Commissioner, responsible for most of the activities of British official Missions outside the Embassy and Consulates. The British Bureau of Information and the function of public relations, were thus intimately tied to the other missions. This appointment gave to British representation at that time a certain measure of unity of control which has not appeared in this war. Lord Reading, who succeeded Sir Cecil Spring Rice as Ambassador in January 1918, took over also the title and functions of High Commissioner. A considerable degree of unity was maintained because of the existence of a deputy commissioner and because the habit of central authority had been formed, and probably even more because of the unification of the two posts. It is worthy of record here also that, either because of altered psychological conditions in Washington in 1918, or because of the personal qualities of both the British and the Americans concerned, important and valuable friendships were formed during 1917 and '18 which were most helpful to public representation as well as to the achievement of technical objectives.

As to the development of representation in this war, reference has already been made to the burden which has been imposed on the organs charged with publicity. There is no need to go very deeply into the detailed history of the Ministry of Information's activities since 1939, but it may be useful to describe some of the developments.

It had been arranged, in the summer of 1939, that when war broke out and a Ministry of Information was established its American Division should take over the responsibility for the British Library of Information and expand its work. It was also arranged that the duty of reporting on American opinion as expressed in the press, should be resumed by the British Library from the Embassy to which this task had been surrendered by the Library in 1931. The Embassy had been able to make only rudimentary reports during the intervening years, and was quite ready to hand over the duty of preparing them in order to leave its energies free for other wartime duties. New York was, moreover, in some ways a more convenient natural centre for this operation. As a result, there came into existence in September 1939 the Survey Section of the British Library, which shortly undertook to review opinions as expressed not only in the press, but over the radio and through some other channels of [illegible] communication.

The Survey Section expanded with moderate rapidity, and as it gained connexions with the press and radio in the course of its duties it became, in some degree, a channel through which journalists and broadcasters asked for information from the Library. The demands for prompt information for publication made on the Library through this channel and directed to the Information Section of the Library increased so rapidly, and the need for rapidity of action became so obvious, that it became, by the spring of 1940, very clear that they constituted an entirely different function from the educational and cultural aspect of the Library proper. The long-term objective of creating goodwill by education was still, and increasingly, of vital importance, but it did not fit in well with the function of speed in publicity, through the channels of mass communication, of immediate developments in British Government policy and events in the progress of the war. Towards the end of the summer the Ministry of Information sent to America a special representative to examine into the functions of the British Library. (This was Mr. S.L. Childs who shortly thereafter became Counsellor of the Embassy as representative of the Ministry, with the special duty of dealing with the press.) He recommended the formation of a separate organization, the British Press Service, to concern itself with publicity, and despite opposition from the Ministry of Information Lord Lothian not only endorsed this idea, but established the organization, infusing into it some of his own views. The Press Service took over from the Library its Survey Section, and added to its staff rapidly.

Over an extended period [illegible], partly because of [illegible] of policy and means of securing publicity material on the part of the Ministry and partly because of very active criticism in London of both the British Library and the Press Service the liaison between London and America further deteriorated. Meanwhile Lord Lothian died, and his philosophic understanding of the nature of representation was lost.

There is no reason here to discuss the long history of controversy which developed through the establishment of the British Information Services in June 1941, under a Director-General (Sir Gerald Campbell) who assumed supervision of the British Library and Press Service, and its complete absorption of the Library and Press Service and the abolition of their separate existences in March, 1942. It is sufficient here to analyse these changes in terms of the main objectives.

It was in the spring of 1941, after Lord Lothian's death, that the reasons for the existence of two separate offices were forgotten: these reasons were, first, the essential difference technically between the function of creation of goodwill through educational means, and the function of publicity. The second was the very strong preference of publicists to be dealt with by an organization especially intended for their needs, and of educationalists and others to avoid dealing with an organization tainted with publicity (or 'propaganda') the distinction was sound; both organizations achieved real goodwill in their own fields, and if the needs had been properly understood a great deal of valuable accumulated goodwill would not have been wasted. There was, it is true, insufficient understanding of the difference of function within the organizations themselves, and a certain jealousy which led to overlapping which was due to inexperience and to the great difficulty of finding and training suitable people for the highly technical work of national publicity. (The staffs of the two organizations together increased from [illegible]teen at the beginning of the war to two hundred and fifty in 19[illegible]. Offices were opened at Washington, Chicago and San Francisco. [illegible] of these people had any specific former training for their work.)

In combination with the lack of understanding of the technical aspects, and with the failure of the Ministry to provide adequate material for the functions of goodwill education and publicity, there came a serious recession. The experience of a unified representation in America, and the [illegible] use of publicity [illegible] of its [illegible], ceased after Lord Lothian's death. Increasingly it came to be assumed that it was the business of the Ministry of Information, through its representatives in America, to undertake almost the whole job of representation, including the whole job of publicity. It seemed then that, [illegible] to be [illegible], in the complete absence of any policy emanating from London, that policy would be made by the Ministry's officials in America, and that [illegible] (though in reality it did not always provide the necessary material for publicity and information). This was not only putting the cart before the horse; it was putting the [illegible].

Naturally, although there were many technical successes in publicity, and although experience was gained, the major objectives which should have been pursued by a strategy of representation were not defined. Dissatisfaction was felt and expressed in many ways and by many people: the Ministry of Information was blamed, and, as was probably natural, felt that the fault lay with its representatives in America. It resorted to changes of personnel and administrative organization: these were ineffectual and again changes were made. There is little reason to believe that the new changes will be more effectual than the old unless changes are also made in the whole theory and practice of representation.

It is not necessary to deal at very great length with the general representational aspects of other British Government missions since much of the obligation which they might have assumed has been passed over to the Ministry of Information's representatives. But it is interesting to point out that while they have refused, by and large, to undertake the really onerous task of representation in its full sense, several at least of them have appointed officers to perform the technical function of publicity, thus overlapping on the proper ground of the Information Services and effectively creating a great deal of confusion. For example publicists of importance have been known to complain that they have been approached by three or more representatives of different missions on one subject, given contradictory ideas, and left gasping as to the real nature of British policy. They are apt to ask, on such occasions, who is the Government's spokesman.

On the other hand, even though many of the British Government's five thousand or so employees in America are Americans, no real attempt has been made to unify the British among them as a representative force. It must be repeated that this cannot be done by the Ministry of Information or its representatives: only a properly constituted superior authority with an understanding of what representation means can do it successfully.

These criticisms ought not to be allowed to detract from the reputation of those many British officials in America who have devotedly concerned themselves with making friends with Americans, trying to give them the best possible impression of Britain and British policy, and finding their own explanations for British action. They have done an amazingly good job, and it is not their fault that the name of Britain does not yet in America always smell so sweet as a rose.

IV The proper function of publicity

The business of this department is publicity, not "diplomacy". So, it is reported, read a minute by an accountant of the Ministry of Information on an expense account submitted by an official. The Ministry could adopt no better motto. It is a technical business, and it is important to notice that in home affairs it has concerned itself chiefly with its proper function, which has been described as "explanation, not exhortation". "Exhortation" is often a political necessity, but it can be exercised best by politicians: no one has succeeded in it so completely as Mr. Churchill. But without the lowlier arts of explanation and publicity the exhortations of the great may be, and often are, less effective than they should be. It is one of the duties of the publicity expert to advise on the best technical means of bringing both exhortation and explanation to the people.

Unfortunately from the days of the Planning Section of the Ministry of Information in the Spring and Summer of 1939 the extent and the limitations of the publicity function were both misunderstood. Much of the time spent in the planning of the Ministry was consumed by irrelevant discussion of policy based on false estimates of foreign opinion and the way in which it would move under the pressure of war. Political experience and technical experience of publicity were alike lacking. At the best experience in some individual form of communication, like journalism or advertizing or films, was thought to be a sufficient qualification in publicity, and so far as foreign countries were concerned a knowledge of a particular country, though it might be slight, was often treated as a qualification for handling publicity to that country. Moreover, in confusing publicity with the wider task of representation, and assuming that the latter was a primary function of the Ministry in relation to the publics of foreign countries, it was often completely forgotten that the task of representation involves a knowledge of ones own country even more than a knowledge of the country to which representation is undertaken.

Thus in the matter of representation the Ministry was too ambitious from the start, while in the matter of publicity it was inept and unexperienced.

It is plain that these faults have persisted, though in the two and a half years which have elapsed since the war began the technical quality of the Ministry's Divisions dealing with channels of publicity (e.g. films and photographs) has very clearly improved. The same is true in regard to some of the similar technical sections in the Ministry's British Information Services in America. But the American Division of the Ministry has made less progress, for reasons probably beyond its control. The reason is simple: they have tried to deal with representation, which is not their function, and have neglected the art of publicity, which is.

On 10th June 1940 Mr. Arthur Krock, writing in the New York Times, discussed the task of coordinating British publicity in America which had just been undertaken by Sir Gerald Campbell. He said that it was most difficult, because (a) the British Government apparently could not decide whether American aid could best be obtained by optimism, hard realism or pessimism in reporting the facts of the war.

(b)/

(b) the American Government had also wavered between these possibilities (c) the publicity policies of the two Governments had never been coordinated. Leaving aside Mr. Krock's use of the word publicity to mean what here is described as representation (a use in which he was quite justified because the difference between the two functions was not understood by the British themselves) Mr. Krock was right. There was no policy. Such variations of optimism and pessimism as there were were undertaken by the publicity organizations in London and America on their own initiative and often uncoordinated with one another. Mr. Krock's article again serves here to point to one of the fundamentals of good representation, on the basis of which a publicity machine can be set to work. In order to have a policy it is necessary first to be well informed as to the actual fluctuations of opinion in America (or whatever country is concerned); second, to have knowledge of the national tendencies which control developments of public opinion - that is to say, of existing prejudicies and habits of mind - and to combine these with knowledge of the actual developments of fact and with decision as to the results which it is desirable to achieve. Only then can there emerge a policy which is properly calculated to achieve the desired effect. And to put this policy into operation it is necessary to have machinery of representation and of publicity.

Unfortunately a proper concurrence of these various factors has never existed. A very good job of surveying opinion in America has been done by the Survey Department of the British Information Services, but since its staff has not had a knowledge of British Government policy and no member of it has been in England since the war began it is not surprising that the reports it has made have not been directed to the most desirable subjects. Nor, in using and interpreting these reports, has sufficient attention ever been paid to the background of existing American prejudice and ideas, so that prophecy as to the results to be expected from future action has been almost impossible.

It is now necessary to turn to the conditions necessary for successful national publicity, and to an examination of its objectives.

It must first of all be recognized that this is a technical function in which technical training is necessary. While his opinion about national policy may be no more important than that of anyone else, the publicity man should have such a knowledge of the channels of publicity in general, or the particular channel with which he is concerned as an individual, that he can advise on the use of that channel for representation and also use it himself under proper direction in order to reach and effect the opinions of the public. But there is one factor in national publicity abroad which makes it entirely different from almost any kind of commercial publicity: that is, that the sales resistance is felt not so much towards the product to be sold, as towards the advertizing itself. This is particularly true in America, where the "propaganda phobia" of the 1920's and 30's, which was especially strong during the period of the "phony war", has not yet disappeared, and probably will not. It should be therefore the first rule of British publicity in America, as distinct from British representation, that the publicity machine should be as little visible to the general public as possible, and that it should be well known only so far as necessary to those Americans in control of the channels of publicity through whom it must work. (The publicity man as an individual in his private life should of course comport himself as well as any other British official from the representational point of view). This cardinal rule was broken by the appointment of Sir Gerald Campbell, and because of the failure to understand the difference between representation and publicity. Up till that time the name of the British Press Service had not been mentioned in the press more than two or three times, and never in a hostile sense; yet it was well known to newspaper and radio men all over America, and it could claim with justice that material originated by it reached from six to ten million Americans every day. Since that time the name of the British Information Services (and to a less extent of the Press Service) has frequently appeared in the press, and often unfavourably. The efficacy of the Press Service has somewhat declined as a result.

The Director General was a well known and generally liked man, but because of this very fact the existence of British publicity (usually referred to as "propaganda") has been the subject of unfavourable comment. A similar mistake was made earlier by the British Library of Information circulating widely its publication "Bulletins from Britain". Quite apart from questions as to the quality of this publication it was a mistake - perpetrated originally by the German Library of Information and copied from them - to make the Library well known to a general public. This was not its function and it has suffered severely as a result. The only saving grace of Bulletins from Britain has been that names have been added to the mailing list only on request.

It is a curious but interesting fact that publicists in America will respect and protect the good name of a national publicity agency such as the British Press Service which is trying to serve them with honesty. They will usually recognize that it is undertaking special pleading, and will not respect it the less for that, so long as they know that the men who are dealing with them are sincere. They will, in fact, treat this as a craft related to their own.

It must be emphasised that this general principle of avoiding publicity for the publicity experts must not infringe the general rule laid down in part I of this memorandum. It is essential to follow legitimate methods and the avoidance of obtrusiveness is quite another thing from complete concealment of the source from which opinion is disseminated. The British publicist in America must never masquerade as something other than that which he is. The safeguard of honesty for the American public is the American publicists who act as the channels of dissemination, and if complete honesty and fair dealing with them is lacking it is quite certain that public protests will occur, and will be effective. The honesty of British publicity in America in the last twenty years has been its saving grace.

The second cardinal principle of good publicity in America and elsewhere is that those in charge of it shall be fully aware of all the channels of publicity available to them and shall make the maximum practical use of the resources at their disposal. This obligation extends not only to the most senior officials but to all those concerned with direction, since otherwise the natural tendency will be for inappropriate channels of publicity to be used. National (or international) publicity requires a special understanding of the problems which it involves and experience in assessing the special values of different channels of publicity for this purpose.

Special technical experience in particular fields of publicity is also required; and technicians are relatively easy to come by and to assimilate to the work of national publicity provided that sufficient experience and knowledge is available at the top.

It would be too invidious a task here to discuss the failures of the Ministry of Information at home and in America in regard to its publicity operations, because to do so would involve personalities in an unfavourable sense. It is however a fact that there are practically no officials who are properly trained by theory or experience in national publicity, and that this is a lack which could and should be remedied. Because of this lack the second cardinal principle has been broken completely: there is no maximization of effort, and an enormous amount of wastage. Let us take two simple examples. Radio is without any question whatever the most important channel of communication in America through which opinion may be formed and it is possible to estimate with scientific accuracy - and indeed the estimates have been made - the special aspects of radio which are most effective and useful for publicity purposes. Yet the staff devoted to radio work in America, and for America in London, is infinitesimal. And five sixths of the staff is concerned not with publicity at all but with monitoring.

The second example is the speaking platform, a secondary but important channel of mass-communication. There is in New York a small section devoted to the handling of British speakers, and a good deal of energy is displayed in London and in America in getting these speakers out to America. But with all this effort there are rarely more than three British speakers operating in America at one time under the auspices of the Ministry of Information. In effect the platform, as a channel of communication, is practically untouched. For every one British lecturer speaking in America there are thousands of Americans, some of them of extreme importance. An American magazine, recognizing the value of such lecturers, employs a staff larger than that of the speakers section of the British Information Services to send advance copies of that magazine to American speakers as they travel about the country, thus achieving for itself a great deal of valuable publicity. This illustrates very clearly the difference between representation and publicity: we must have some British speakers in America as representatives: but when we are trying to make the maximum use of publicity for the extension of representation we should concentrate on the American lecturers as our channel.

These two examples are taken almost at random, and are not in any way exhaustive.

It can be asserted with conviction that although at least one survey of the available channels of publicity was made as long ago as the Summer of 1940, and although many recommendations for more appropriate use of the limited resources available have been made, no well thought out plan of publicity organization has been put into operation.

The lack of policy, lack of proper planning, and lack of training and experience together account for the inefficiency of British publicity machinery in, and directed towards, America. But there is no doubt at all that the machinery is capable of adaptation to the true needs, and that many of the individuals concerned have achieved some experience and are honestly intent on doing a good job.

Although it is not strictly relevant to the topic of publicity it may here be worthwhile to mention that specific training for representative duties in America is as desirable as is training for publicity: but it is of a different character. Any individual who is to undertake publicity work for Britain in America should have both trainings, because, although he himself should remain out of the limelight, he will find it difficult to assist in the process of representation unless he is able to understand its nature and objectives.

To some degree every British official in America whether he is concerned with publicity or not, is thought of by Americans as representative of Britain. He therefore has a special opportunity of doing good, and a special capacity of doing harm. There are too many individuals who have never thought of this responsibility, and the low opinion of British officials which has developed in some circles in Washington and New York and elsewhere is partly the fault of these selfish people. Every British official in America should be taught to think of himself as a sort of "commando" in representation, no matter what his technical job may be. And such teaching must be careful, thorough and explicit. Exhortation to good behaviour is not enough, nor is it sufficient to give each a pamphlet on American history and customs to read. The inadequacy of this last, though well intentioned, method has been demonstrated in the air training camps where British youths meet Americans.

The need for special training in representation for officials who are more particularly charged with it will be discussed in the next chapter of recommendations.

V. Recommendations.

A. Representation.

It is not the purpose of this final section to develop detailed plans of operation or schemes of organisation, but rather to draw together the principles on which British representation to and in America should be based, and to provide a skeleton of suggestions which may be given flesh by later discussion. Some of the conclusions reached seem necessarily to affect representation in other democratic countries also.

(a) Beyond the requirement that representation must be treated as political in the highest sense of that word, that it should be unified and that it must be a matter of intelligent interest to the Cabinet and Parliament, it is not possible here to lay down precisely the adjustments which need to be made in British political practice. It is clear however that the increase of attention which is demanded of the responsible political authorities is likely to make it impossible for any one minister to concern himself adequately with representation as a whole and at the same time to be directly responsible for the vast and increasing business of relations between Governments, and with foreign public opinion. At the same time it is equally true that unity of representation to a foreign country is made much more difficult if several ministers are independently responsible for the various aspects of representation including those which concern public opinion. It would therefore seem reasonable to suggest that one minister - probably the Foreign Secretary - should be recognized as the senior minister concerned with all aspects of relations abroad. Other ministers concerned with various aspects of representation abroad, including a minister responsible f[illegible]s it exists at present, should be subordinate to him. Alternatively though this would probably be less effective, the various ministers concerned should form a Cabinet committee with a special secretariat. It is most important that the function of representation to each of the important democratic countries should be considered as a whole, and vital therefore that there should be a sufficient number of persons sufficiently well informed and with sufficient time to take a broad and general view. Rehandling of public representation cannot be undertaken by persons who also have detailed departmental duties. They should be persons of political experience. Only on the basis of such a groundwork is it possible to add the structure of adequate representation abroad.

(b) There is so great a similarity between the problems of representation in the Dominions and those in the United States that it would be very useful to have a closer liason between the two; both the political responsibility and the administrative execution of policy would then be facilitated. An excellent example of the need for this is to be found in the recent interactions of American, United Kingdom and Australian public opinion about the Japanese conquest of Singapore and the Dutch Indies, and the threat to Australia. Because there is a greater similarity between representation to America and the Dominions than between representation to America and non-democratic countries, government officials should be transferred rather for example between Canberra or Ottawa and Washington and vice versa, than between democratic and less democratic capitals. Any such development would have to be delicately made in order to avoid irritating American or Dominion opinion.

(c)

(c) In order to achieve unity of representation on a political basis it is desirable, first, that the Ambassador in Washington should have an incontestable superiority of responsibility to all departmental missions, second, that he should have political as well as administrative assistance from persons who are politically minded in the best sense of the word, third, that his responsibility should be towards a Foreign Secretary or section of the Cabinet with functions such as have been described above.

Unity of representation abroad can only be achieved if it is recognised to be a serious concern of all officials stationed abroad whatever department they represent. This will never happen unless the senior representatives of British Government departments in America are and can think of themselves constantly as forming a sort of cabinet of which the Ambassador is the head. The chart in appendix I suggests truly that this does not exist at present: the Supply Council is rather a clearing house than a Cabinet, and its concerns are primarily technical. It has no general representational function.

The problem of finding a political forum to take in America the part taken in Britain by Parliament is difficult. But it will be remembered that the Congress in America does not provide for the Administration exactly such a forum as is provided in England by Parliament, because of the division in the Federal Government between the Executive and Legislative powers. Presidents and their Cabinet members since President Wilson have found it necessary to institute regular press conferences, and to use other means of informing the public, and, provided that the task is properly undertaken, and that the need for informed representation in America is recognised in London, there is no reason why similar machinery should not be used by the Ambassador and his assistants.

(d) It is essential that the liason between London and Washington for political purposes should be greatly strengthened. This means more frequent journeys home by the Ambassador and his political assistants.

(e) It is also essential that administrative officials concerned with representation in its fuller sense shall travel home more frequently, so that they may have a better understanding of their own country. It is not sufficient - as has largely been the practice - to send officials from Britain to America: it is indeed far more important to bring home those who are stationed there. [It is noticeable that colonial officials are brought home far more often (for reasons of health) than are British officials stationed in America, though they might go with equal convenience for purposes of health to nearer countries, and the need for their return home is not so great]. It is justifiable to recommend such a movement on the largest possible scale. When such officials return home they should take some personal leave on their own devices, but should also be required to go through a quite specific course of reeducation in British life and politics.

(f) Both those officials who are at the beginning of their careers as representatives abroad and those who are already experienced should be given special training in the purposes and methods of representation in a democracy. A good general education is not sufficient. There is at least as much to be learned of technique in representation as is neccessary in the training of the armed forces, yet men are sent abroad to represent their countries with no specific training whatever. This is particularly true of temporary officials in wartime.

P. Publicity.

Publicity must be the servant of representation and not its master. Consequently the flow of instruction as to policy should follow the line Cabinet to Foreign Minister to Ambassador and local political staff to publicity specialists. It should not follow the line Ministry of Information to publicity specialists direct. Indeed the Ministry of Information should not be concerned with policy abroad at all, but rather with the provision of trained publicity specialists and of material for their use. The responsibility of the publicity experts in America should be, without any question, to the Ambassador and not to London. This may have to be achieved by a transfer of financial control.

(a) The need for technical training, first in the problems of national publicity, and second in special aspects of the work involved should be recognized. A school for this purpose should be set up and every publicity official abroad should be called home to attend it. Even if fifty per cent of them were called home at one time the gain would be far greater than the immediate apparent loss by reduction of staff.

Methods of selection must also be improved, and there must be just as great a severity in the rejection of unsuitable persons as there would be in the armed forces and in business. While older men are frequently well suited to the duties of representation there are few men over forty who have the necessary modern background for specialization in publicity.

(b) When a trained staff is available its functions in advising and carrying out the instructions of the Ambassador should consist first in a capacity to estimate the probable effects on the public of any proposed line of action, second in a capacity to recognize the most suitable channels of communication for any given purpose, and the cost of using those channels in relation to the resources available, and third, such a knowledge of and relationship to the channels of communication and the persons who control them as to be able to use them without friction.

(c) It should be recognized that the diversity in the methods of education and publicity which are available may demand diversity of organization. The recent pressure for unification which has resulted in the abolition of the British Library of Information and the British Press Service, and their unification in the British Information Services, seems to be the result of a confusion between the functions of representation and publicity. Provided there is an adequate policy, emanating from London and directed and disseminated from Washington, there is reason to believe that diversity of organization would achieve more useful results than unification of administration in New York.

[I have very specific views on the proper form of organization, and on the technical performance of much of the detailed work of publicity, but these views must be reserved for expression in other ways.]

C. American Representation in Britain.

It is most important to realize that the improvement of British representation in America is only half of the objective. This is a two way problem, and it is in our interest as well as that of the United States that the British public should bear goodwill towards the United States as a nation, and should understand the Policies of the United States Government in so far as they affect Britain. It is important therefore that we should encourage rather than hinder any attempt by the United States to maintain in Britain the same kind of representatio which we should try to maintain in America.

Mr. Law.

I attach a paper by Mr. Alan Dudley, until recently in charge of the British Library of Information at New York. Mr. Dudley was for eight years in New York in the B.L.I. under Mr. Angus Fletcher. When Mr. Angus Fletcher left he took his place, and has now returned to this country following the re-organisation of the British Information Services in the United States.

It is 'x' summarised in the first minute on A6403.

Mr. Dudley suggested that you might like to read his x paper while in the aeroplane. I cannot attempt to condense it, but the first practical step to put his ideas into operation seems to be the creation in the Cabinet Secretariat of a small group of people whose duty it would be to keep the Ministry of Information and the B.B.C. informed of the policy of His Majesty's Government, and of the line to be taken by the Ministry and the B.B.C. not only on current events, but in advance of events. At present Mr. Dudley thinks that there is a gap in the machinery here, and he tells me that this view is also shared in the B.B.C. and in the Ministry of Information.

I explained to Mr. Dudley that if he wishes to pursue his idea he must get the Ministry of Information and not the Foreign Office to start the ball rolling. He maintained, however - and this is, indeed, true - that it is very definitely a Foreign Office interest as well, and for this reason he was particularly anxious that you should know of his ideas.

Mr. Dudley is an extremely able man and I certainly think his views are worth attention.

D. E. Scott

20th August, 1942.

Miss Scofield / Done C.S.

Put ~~[illegible]~~ Mr Dudley's memo. and a copy of the minute in A 6403 mentioning by Sir D. Scott into Mr Law's folder. P.G. 20/8

6 Abingdon Court W8.
WEStern 3106

INDEXED

6403 399 45

Sir David Scott

Frank Evans tells me that he sent on to you a copy of my memorandum on British Representation in the United States: I hope that you will have time to read it, though it is rather long, and that you will be so kind as to let me know what you think of it.

Some minor corrections should have been made in the text, and the appendix was not included in the copy typed at the Foreign Office. I now enclose it.

A A Dudley 13/vii

Appendix I Simplified Chart of British Representation in the United States of America (Adapted from official Chart of British Supply Council.)

May 1942


BRITISH WAR CABINET
North American Supply Cte of British Cabinet (Minister of Production)
Ministry of War Transport
Ministry of Supply
Ministry of Aircraft Production
Ministry of Food
Admiralty
War Office
Royal Air Force
Foreign Office
Ministry of Economic Warfare
Ministry of Information
British Supply Council in North America
HBM Ambassador
British Embassy
Joint Staff Mission
Admiralty Repair Mission
Ministry of War Transport (New York)
British Merchant Shipping Mission (London)
British Purchasing Commission
British Raw Materials Mission
British Air Commission
British Food Mission
British Admiralty Delegation (supplies)
British Information Services

NB. It has been necessary to omit Dominion Indian & Colonial representation from this Chart for the sake of simplicity. Several minor missions are also ommitted.

D.S.S.

The attached letter from Dudley indicates that he has hopes that his paper (herewith) may perhaps influence his immediate prospects. I don't know where in the F.O. he could fit in, unless perhaps in E. & R. Dept.

I am ashamed to have kept his paper so long since Tahourdin analyses and/

minuted it, but I plead
the pressure of many other
and more urgent [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

INDEXED

6 Abingdon Court
London W8.

22/vii/42

6403 399 45

28 AUG 1942

Dear Evans

I am going to take a short holiday in the country: my address for the next ten days will be

at Bodlondeb
Dolgelley Merioneth.

If there are any enquiries for me which are urgent I can be reached at Dolgelley 123. by telephone.

I saw Towarden the other day & he said that he had been reading my memorandum: I gathered it had not yet gone on to Sir David Scott. I shall be grateful to know when the latter has seen it, since my future plans must to some extent depend on the reception of some of the ideas I expressed.

I will get in touch with you again when I get back to town.

Yours sincerely

Alan Dudley

INDEXED 50

A6403 399 45

792.

[illegible]

Sir David Scott.

I saw Cruikshank and Darvall, as you suggested, and also Grubb.

Cruikshank expressed interest in my memorandum, but, as I expected, he took the view that the proposals made concerned high policy, on which he thought it improper for him to express official views while as to his personal views, he felt them to be of no consequence. My impression is that the circumstances under which he has resumed the Directorship of the American Division of the Ministry strengthen his natural tendency to caution in dealing with matters of wide importance. He is taking a fortnight's leave, and will not be back until towards the end of next week.

Darvall had previously expressed agreement about the general principles which I put forward. On this occasion he confined himself to arguing that the obstacles placed in the way of such a scheme would be very great. He did not believe that the necessary cooperation would be forthcoming.

The general impression I gain from these two conversations is that positive initiatory action cannot be expected from the American Division of the Ministry of Information. This does not depress me because I did not expect any other result, and I am very sure that there are many serious obstacles and much inertia to be overcome.

¶ I did not ask Grubb to committ himself in any way, but merely took the opportunity to point out to him that the proposals made in my memorandum would be of official concern to him because the Empire Division of the M.O.I is under his control, and ~~the Dominion representation should bear~~ representation to the Dominions should benefit equally with representation to America under the proposed scheme.

Meanwhile I have worked out a very short version of my proposal regarding the creation of a Foreign Affairs section of the Cabinet Secretariat, and the reasons for its creation, which I hope to submit to the critical examination of several people who are likely to be directly concerned, and which I will then revise and send to you.

Have you any further instructions for me?

AA Dudley. (6 Abingdon Court W8)
31/viii.

A6403/399/45

FOREIGN OFFICE
S.W. 1.
3rd September,
1942.

My dear Alan,

Many thanks for your note of the 31st August. I look forward to seeing the short version of your proposals.

I am sorry you have not been able to interest the Ministry of Information more, but I am sure that that is the citadel which has to be stormed.

(Signed) D.J. SCOTT

A.A. Dudley, Esq.